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A savings deposit may be withdrawn at will. 12 A time deposit creates the
relation of debtor-creditor between bank and customer;$ so also does a
savings deposit.14 Moreover, under banking practice, time deposit funds and
savings deposit funds are not separated, but are mingled with the general
funds of the bank.15 The chief difference between the two transactions lies
in the time at which the respective funds may be withdrawn. The instant
case, however, indicates that there is another difference, namely, a benefit
to the infant by the savings deposit. But why is the infant benefited in the
one case more than in the other? In both transactions he is provided with
a safe place for his money and is paid interest on that money. If, as is
thought, the benefits are substantially the same in both cases, then the only
difference lies in the time of payment. To seize upon this technical distinc-
tion seems arbitrary, since the policy of protecting infants from disad-
vantageous contracts would seem to be no stronger in the case of the time
deposit than in the case of the savings deposit.
There is one factor which may have influenced the court in making this
distinction. In the Stinson case only one infant was seeking a preference,
and that in the amount of $900. The Phillips case, however, was a test
case, and had the plaintiff there been allowed a preference, many other
school children would also have been preferred, and the preferred claims
would have totalled over $80,000. If this factor is important, it remains to
be seen what will happen when the next possible situation arises, namely,
where a single minor, as in the Stinson case, attempts to establish a prefer-
ence where he has a savings deposit, as in the Phillips case.
J. L. F.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DEPRESSION AS CONSIDERATION FOR REDUCING
RENT-[Texas]-.Is an economic depression sufficient consideration for an
agreement reducing the rent payable under a contract of lease? This is
answered affirmatively by a Texas Court of Appeals in the recent case of
Liebreich v. Tyler State Bank & Trust, Co.' The plaintiff had leased prop-
erty to the defendant in 1931 for five years. Because of financial hardship
in 1933, the defendant requested a reduction of rental price, and the plain-
tiff assented. At expiration of the five-year term, the plaintiff sued for the
original contract price, alleging lack of consideration for the modification
agreement. In declaring economic depression a good consideration, the
12. The contract may require 30 days notice of the withdrawal.
13. State v. Corning State Savings Bank, 136 Iowa 79, 113 N. W. 500
(1907).
14. 1 Morse, Banks and Banking (6th ed. 1928) sec. 289; Kantor Bros.
v. Wile, 158 N. Y. Supp. 115, 93 Misc. Rep. 438 (1916).
15. Inquiry at representative banks discloses that although the funds are
kept separate as bookkeeping items, yet they are both considered liabilities
of the bank and are not separated for investment purposes.
1. 100 S. W. (2d) 152 (Tex. 1936).
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court classified it with those "unexpected obstacles" which give rise to the
need for "readjustment of contractual relations. 2
The majority of courts hold that a general economic adversity, however
disastrous it may be in its individual consequences, is no warrant for abro-
gation of the common law rule of consideration, viz., benefit to promisor
or detriment to promisee.3 These same courts, however, are willing to find
a sufficient consideration for modification agreements in the mutual can-
cellation of the primary lease,4 or in the lessor's apprehension as to the
probable failure of the tenant,5 and some courts find consideration in that
the lessee would not have remained in possession under the lease unless the
rent were reduced.6 At last two jurisdictions have indicated, and perhaps
too broadly, that an agreement for reduction of rent may be enforced even
without any consideration at all.7
The few decisions following the principal case exhibit a modern
fendency to depart from the strict common law rule and give effect to
2. For the line of cases holding that unexpected hardship will give rise
to at least an "equitable" ground of rescission see 43 A. L. R. 1451, 1466
(1926); L. R. A. 1915B 1, 44.
3. Levine v. Blumenthal 117 N. J. Law 23, 186 AtI. 457 (1936); 1
Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) 347. For decisions refusing to find con-
sideration in financial depression see: Levine v. Blumenthal, herein noted;
Campbell v. Spare, 180 Cal. 128, 179 Pac. 384 (1919); Gordon v. Green, 51
Cal. App. 765, 197 Pac. 955 (1921); Atwood v. Hayes et al., 139 Old. 95,
281 Pac. 259 (1929).
4. Sutherland v. Madden, 46 P. (2d) 32 (Kan. 1935); Raymond v.
Krauskopf, 87 Iowa 602, 54 N. W. 432 (1893) (tenant's crops destroyed by
storms). A similar situation furnished consideration in Latham v. Douglas,
206 S. W. 392 (Mo. 1918); Cf. Sandbrook v. Morrison Inv. Co., 209 Mo.
App. 600, 239 S. W. 543 (1922) (contract for sale of real estate).
5. This seems to be the only consideration in Brown v. Cairns, 53 Kan.
693, 66 Pac. 1033 (1901); see also Sherman & Co. v. Buffum & Pendleton,
90 Ore. 352, 179 Pac. 241 (1919); this factor apparently influenced the
court in Latham v. Douglas, 206 S. W. 392 (Mo. 1918).
6. These decisions declare the lessor is benefited by a continuous occu-
pancy of the premises. Commonwealth Investment Co. v. Fellsway Motor
Mart, 1 N. E. (2d) 201 (Mass. 1936) ; Bowman v. Wright, 65 Neb. 661, 91
N. W. 580 (1902); Cooper v. Fretnoransky, 42 N. Y. St. Rep. 472, 16
N. Y. Supp. 866 (1892); Parrot v. Mexican Central Railway, 207 Mass.
184, 93 N. E. 590, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 261 (contract for advertising);
contra, Cold Storage Co. v. Ice & Storage Co., 77 Colo. 556, 238 Pac. 42
(1925). The tenant's reliance (as demonstrated by retaining possession of
the premises) upon the lessor's promise to reduce the rent also seems to
furnish consideration in some of these cases. This view is apparently in
accord with the American Law Institute. Restatement, Contracts (1932)
sec. 90 (promise reasonably inducing substantial action or forbearance).
7. Wilson v. Windham, 213 Ala. 31, 104 So. 232 (1935); Hurlbut v.
Butte-Kansas Co., 120 Kan. 205, 243 Pac. 324 (1926). The latter case
treated the reduction as a waiver on the lessor's part, and hence needing
no consideration. See criticism of this holding in 43 A. L. R. 1480 (1926).
In West Philadelphia Buick Co. v. Shuster et al., 120 Pa. Super. 329, 183
Atl. 75 (1936), there was no consideration, but the subsequent agreement
was valid in so far as it had been executed.
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what has been termed a "reasonable" modification of the primary lease.8
Thus, financial depression has been recognized as an unexpected hardship
which will support an agreement to reduce the rental price of railway cars
where the years covered by the lease extended into a period of monetary
deflation.9 A willingness to apply this liberal view has also been indicated
by the Minnesota courts, especially in the matter of rent reductions, where
it is apparent business adversity has made the terms of the original lease
no longer just.10 Other courts, although not basing the consideration tech-
nically upon the existence of financial depression, have been greatly influ-
enced by such a change in economic conditions at the time the secondary
agreement was made. 1
There seems little need for the theory of the instant case. Other courts,
under similar circumstances, have based their decisions upon more sub-
stantial grounds.' 2 It is submitted that a general adoption of this view
would lead to many obvious difficulties which do not arise under the cus-
tomary view of consideration. For instance, what constitutes a "depres-
sion" to warrant reduction of rent? Will a depression in a particular trade
suffice, or will a depression in a particular locality furnish consideration?
These, and similar queries, would arise as a result of the wide-spread adop-
tion of the theory of the instant case.
W. E.
TAxATIoN-IMmUNrTY or CiTy EMPLOYEE FRoimi FEDERAL INcoMn TAX-
[Federal].-The preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their
governments is very much within the design and care of the Constitution.'
It is to that high end that the Supreme Court has recognized the rule, which
rests upon necessary implication, that the National Government may not
tax the governmental means and instrumentalities of the State.2 Yet with
8. But see Levine v. Blumenthal, 117 N. 3. Law 23, 186 Atl. 457 (1936),
which refutes this view.
9. Commercial Car Line v. Anderson, 224 Ill. App. 187 (1922).
10. Ten Eyck v. Sleeper, 65 Minn. 413, 67 N. W. 1026 (1896); Lindeke
Land Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N. W. 650, 93 A. L. R. 1393
(1934). These decisions also emphasize the retention of the premises by
the tenant (supra, note 6). A liberal view of consideration has also been
adopted by statute in Pennsylvania. The Uniform Written Obligations Act,
Pa. P. S. 985, no. 475, sec. 1, Purdon's Pa. St., Title 33, sec. 6, provides
that a promise will be binding without consideration, if there is an express
statement in writing that the signer intends to be legally bound.
11. Atwood v. Hayes et al., 130 Old. 95, 281 Pac. 259 (1929). See cases
cited supra, note 6.
12. Supra, notes 4, 5, 6.
1. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 19 L. ed. 227 (1869).
2. The Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (1871) ; Van Brocklin
v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 6 S. Ct. 670, 29 L. ed. 845 (1886). The mutual
and complementary immunity from taxation of state and federal instrumen-
talities of government is implicit in our constitutional form of government
and is founded in the doctrine that the power to tax is the power to destroy.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819).
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